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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
I. INTERPRETATION OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA CONSTITUTION'S
SEPARATION OF POWERS CLAUSE
In State v. Whittington,1 the South Carolina Supreme
Court interpreted the South Carolina Constitution's separation
of powers clause. The court struck down a statute which permit-
ted certain hearings to be held, at the arrestee's option, before
either a magistrate or an administrative official. This decision
articulates an approach to the separation of powers doctrine ap-
parently based on uncompromising doctrinal purity.
The case arose when respondent Whittington refused to
submit to a breathalyzer test following his arrest for driving
under the influence of alcohol. Under South Carolina law,2 a mo-
1. 278 S.C. 661, 301 S.E.2d 134 (1983).
2. Section 56-5-2950 provides in part-
(a) Any person who operates a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this
State shall be deemed to have given consent to a chemical test of his breath for
the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his blood if arrested for
any offense arising out of acts alleged to have been committed while the person
was driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating li-
quor.... The arresting officer shall not administer the test and no such test
shall be administered unless the defendant has been informed that he does not
have to take the test but that his privilege to drive will be suspended or denied
if he refuses to submit to the test.
(c) Any person who is unconscious or otherwise in a condition rendering him
incapable of refusal, shall be deemed not to have withdrawn the consent pro-
vided by subsection (a) of this section.
(d) If a person under arrest refuses, upon the request of a law enforcement
officer, to submit to a chemical test as provided in subsection (a) of this sec-
tion, none shall be given, but the State Highway Department, upon the receipt
of a sworn report of the law-enforcement officer that the arrested person had
been driving upon the public highways of the State while under the influence
of intoxicating liquor and that the person had refused to submit to the test and
such refusal was witnessed and certified to on the sworn report by a person,
other than the arresting officer, trained ... to administer such test, shall sus-
pend his license or permit to drive, or any nonresident operating privilege for a
period of ninety days ....
(e) Upon suspending the license or permit to drive or nonresident operating
privilege of any person, or upon determining that the issuance of a license or
permit shall be denied to the person,.. . the South Carolina Highway Depart-
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torist using the state's highways is presumed to consent to
breathalyzer tests, and failure to cooperate ordinarily results in
suspension of the driver's license for ninety days. However, a
driver is entitled to a hearing if he believes there is some reason
that suspension is not justified.3 The 1980 amendment to the
implied consent statute4 provided an option to appear before a
magistrate rather than before an official of the South Carolina
Highway Department. Whittington chose to appear before a
magistrate, who determined that suspension of the license was
not warranted because Whittington was incapable of withhold-
ing consent at the time of his arrest.5 On the State's appeal the
lower court, applying rules from judicial proceedings, found that
the appeal was not timely.6 The State then appealed to the
South Carolina Supreme Court, arguing that the proceeding
ment shall immediately notify the person in writing and upon his request shall
afford him an opportunity for a hearing as provided by § 56-1-370, except that
the scope of such a hearing for the purposes of this section shall be limited to
the issues of whether the person was placed under arrest, whether the person
had been informed that he did not have to take the test but that his privilege
to drive would be suspended or denied if he refused to submit to the test, and
whether he refused to submit to the test upon request of the officer. The South
Carolina Highway Department shall order that the suspension or determina-
tion that there should be a denial of issuance either be rescinded or
sustained ....
S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-2950 (1976).
3. Id., subsection (e). Another section of the code provides in pertinent part-
The licensee may, within ten days after notice of suspension, cancellation or
revocation, except in cases where the suspension, cancellation or revocation is
made mandatory upon the Department, request in writing a review and upon
receipt of such request the Department shall afford him a review. . . . Such
review may be held by a duly authorized agent of the Department, except that
all hearings held pursuant to subsection (e) of § 56-5-2950 may be held, in
the discretion of the licensee, before a magistrate in the county where the
licensee was arrested unless the Department and the licensee agree that such
hearing may be held before a magistrate in some other county. Upon such
review or order of the magistrate the Department shall either rescind its order
of suspension, cancellation or revocation or, good cause appearing therefor
or upon order of the magistrate, may continue, modify or extend the suspen-
sion, cancellation or revocation of such license.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-1-370 (Supp. 1983) (emphasis added).
4. Act of June 11, 1980, No. 501, 1980 S.C. Acts 1470 added the language italicized
at supra note 3.
5. 278 S.C. at 662, 301 S.E.2d at 134. The basis for this determination and its rela-
tion to the narrow grounds for a hearing set out by the statute, supra at note 2, are not
clear from the record and were not addressed on appeal.
6. Record at 5-7.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
before the magistrate was an unconstitutional violation of the
separation of powers doctrine.7
The supreme court agreed that the 1980 amendment vio-
lated article I, section 8 of the South Carolina Constitution,
which states, "In the government of this State, the legislative,
executive, and judicial powers of the government shall be forever
separate and distinct from each other, and no person or persons
exercising the functions of one of said departments shall assume
or discharge the duties of any other."8 In support of its conclu-
sion, the court cited State ex rel. McLeod v. Yonce 9 as holding
that any exercise of power by the judiciary unconnected with the
administration of the judicial function violates the separation of
powers doctrine. Further, because State ex rel. McLeod v.
Crowe 0 held that magistrates are part of the unified judicial sys-
tem, the court reasoned that magistrates may not exercise any
nonjudicial powers. The proceeding at issue in Whittington was
administrative rather than judicial in nature because under the
statutory scheme, control over driver's licenses is an administra-
tive function vested in the Highway Department.11 Despite their
administrative nature, implied consent hearings, through the
amendment, had been singled out for magisterial involvement.
Thus, the court concluded, that portion of the 1980 amendment
which provided the option of a judicial proceeding was invalid as
an unconstitutional assignment of administrative power to the
7. 278 S.C. at 662, 301 S.E.2d at 135. See also Brief of Appellant at 4-13. The re-
spondent did not argue the merits of the constitutional claim, but instead argued the
procedural issue, which the lower court found determinative. The respondent maintained
that the constitutional question was improperly presented on appeal because it was not
litigated in the lower court. Brief of Respondent at 1-2. Respondent's arguments were
not discussed in the supreme court opinion.
8. S.C. CONST. art. I, § 8. For a brief history of the creation of this clause in reaction
to the executive branch assumption of judicial powers during the period of martial law
which followed the Civil War, see Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, Constitu-
tional Law: Separation of Powers [hereinafter cited as Separation of Powers], 33
S.C.L. REv. 25, 26 n. 39 (1981). The inclusion of this clause in the Bill of Rights in the
1868 constitution indicates its original conception as a guarantee of individual liberty.
See 1 J. WOODRUFF, PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF SOUTH CARO-
LINA 339-41 (1968).
9. 274 S.C. 81, 261 S.E.2d 303 (1979).
10. 272 S.C. 41, 249 S.E.2d 772 (1978).
11. Title 56 of S.C. CODE ANN. (1976 & Supp. 1983) regulates not only motor vehi-
cle and driver licensing but also traffic and tickets, insurance, damage appraisal, manu-
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judiciary. Because it was severable from the judicial remedy, the
administrative hearing portion of the amendment was allowed to
stand.
12
The phrasing of the opinion suggests that the decision was
the inevitable result of the doctrine of stare decisis; however, a
reading of the court's prior discussions of the separation of pow-
ers doctrine suggests that the case could have gone the other
way without deviation from precedent. Even considered individ-
ually, the authorities relied upon in this case would hardly dic-
tate the result reached in Whittington since each is distinguish-
able. Yonce struck down a statute requiring the Chief Justice of
the South Carolina Supreme Court to appoint circuit court
judges to preside over certain contested utility rate hearings
before the South Carolina Public Service Commission. Tha't
opinion seems to have been based partly upon findings that "a
circuit judge is a powerful member and an important voice
within the judicial department" and that "the Public Service
Commission is an important arm of the executive branch" deal-
ing with "matters involving millions of dollars." 13 The Whitting-
ton court declined to accept the invitation to flexibility held out
by Yonce's dicta recognizing "some overlapping of authority...
by reason of the minimal degree of involvement."14 Apparently
the court attached no significance to the particular function at
issue in Whittington. This procedure involved lower-level judi-
cial officials' exercise of a duty, historically part of an adminis-
trative scheme, which did not require special administrative ex-
pertise but called upon common judicial skills of applying law to
facts and adjudicating important personal and community inter-
ests. Had the court chosen to distinguish Whittington from
Yonce by the level of the duty involved, Crowe's bare holding
that magistrates are part of the unified judicial system would
have been less relevant.
Instead of applying and extending Yonce and Crowe, the
court could have noted the line of cases sustaining the constitu-
tionality of the State Budget and Control Board,"5 which illus-
12. 278 S.C. at 663, 301 S.E.2d at 136. The effect of the ruling was to strike the
italicized language in the statute set out at supra note 3.
13. 274 S.C. at 84, 261 S.E.2d at 305.
14. Id. at 88, 261 S.E.2d at 306. See Separation of Powers, supra note 8.
15. State ex rel. McLeod v. Edwards, 269 S.C. 75, 236 S.E.2d 406 (1977)(reasoning
[Vol. 36
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trated the possibilities for interbranch cooperation within con-
stitutional limits. In those cases, the court found no separation
of powers violation in an administrative body's exercise of broad
financial powers, despite ex officio membership of two state leg-
islators. This arrangement was determined to represent not a
usurpation of executive power, but a reasonable effort at cooper-
ation, making the special expertise of legislators available to the
executive branch. 16 The procedure at issue in Whittington, how-
ever, is distinguishable from the Budget and Control Board
cases in that the hearing remedy involved not a joint effort but
the duplication of one type of proceeding in two different
branches of government. It is possible that the court in Whit-
tington is signaling an emphasis on doctrinal purity, closing the
door to the flexibility suggested in Yonce and realized in the
Budget and Control Board cases. However, it seems more likely
that the court was influenced by the unique fact pattern in
Whittington: the comprehensive nature of the original adminis-
trative scheme, the legislature's unusual decision to provide oth-
erwise identical remedies in two separate branches of govern-
ment, or the combination of these and other factors.
There is perhaps a significant basis in policy for concern
over this interbranch duplication of remedies-the desire to pre-
vent direct competition between coordinate branches of govern-
ment. Had the procedure at issue in Whittington been allowed
to stand, opportunities might have opened for "forum shopping"
between two branches of government. Thus, a person would
have a choice between an administrative official or a local magis-
trate for the more "favorable" hearing. This type of activity
presents a potential evil beyond simple dual involvement of two
branches of government in one remedy. The most damaging ef-
fect would be encouragement of ill will between two branches of
government, a result which the court would be justifiably anx-
ious to avoid.'"
upholding the Board's constitutionality set forth for the first time); Harper v. Schooler,
258 S.C. 486, 189 S.E.2d 284 (1972); Mims v. McNair, 252 S.C. 64, 165 S.E.2d 355 (1969);
Elliott v. McNair, 250 S.C. 75, 156 S.E.2d 421 (1967).
16. State ex rel. McLeod v. Edwards, 269 S.C. 75, 84, 236 S.E.2d 406, 409 (1977).
17. One can only speculate about whether this competition had in fact arisen in
implied consent hearings and whether disparate results had been reached by the two
forums. The record and briefs do not indicate that the court in Whittington dealt with
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From this perspective, Whittington is arguably consistent
with the Budget and Control Board holdings and with the Yonce
dicta, since these decisions manifest an inclination toward doc-
trinal purity tempered by pragmatic considerations. The empha-
sis in Whittington on the statutory scheme, the consideration in
Yonce of the extent of interbranch overlap, and the dicta in a
Budget and Control Board case about upsetting a "vital part of
the machinery of the government of this State""8 collectively in-
dicate a court aware of and sensitive to practical realities and to
the traditional allocation of governmental powers in the state.
Given the inherent difficulty of drawing lines according to ab-
stract notions of legislative, executive, and judicial powers, 9 this
sensitivity is well-placed. It is also a longstanding part of consti-
tutional jurisprudence in South Carolina.20
18. State ex rel. McLeod v. Edwards, 269 S.C. 75, 84, 236 S.E.2d 406, 409 (1977).
This opinion also notes that the legislature, judiciary, executive, and the people had long
accepted the Board's legitimacy. Oddly, the court chose to articulate its rationale for the
first time at a time when there was little need for justification. This decision came after
some ten years of unbroken (albeit unexplained) approval of the Board by the South
Carolina Supreme Court and after a major constitutional revision had reenacted the sep-
aration of powers clause without modification.
19. Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 408 F. Supp. 321, 341-42 (D.D.C.
1976) indicates standards for drawing these lines.
The modern view of separation of powers rejects . . .metaphysical abstrac-
tions ... and reverts instead to a more pragmatic, flexible, functional
approach ....
V e' ... decline to embrace ... [the] archaic view of the separation of
powers as requiring three airtight departments of government .... Rather,
given the tension between the independence and interdependence of the three
branches, separation of powers questions are to be resolved by analyzing with
particularity the extent to which an act by one branch prevents another from
performing its assigned duties and disrupts the balance among the coordinate
departments of government.
What is said of federal separation of powers is also applicable to state governmental
operations, which have also become increasingly complex as the evolution of a modern
economy and social structure has resulted in demands which stretch traditional catego-
ries of government to their limits. Administrative law and regulation stand as clear ex-
amples of the blurring of traditional distinctions, since a single entity may engage in
traditionally legislative policy determination and then impose sanctions in a quasi-judi-
cial process. A parallel development has occurred in the legislative and judicial branches,
directed toward allowing both self-management and "oversight" of various activities of
other governmental branches.
20. See, e.g., Carolina Glass Co. v. State, 87 S.C. 270, 291, 69 S.E. 391, 399 (1910)
("the Constitution assumed the existence of an organized society, and when it vested the
judicial power in the Courts, it had reference to the judicial power then existing, and
such as the people then understood to be vested in and exercised by the Courts").
6
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Where does all this leave legislators and prospective liti-
gants of cases involving the separation of powers? At the very
least, Whittington suggests extreme caution to legislators who
seek to provide alternative administrative and judicial remedies.
The court is likely to strike down statutory arrangements which
allow parties to choose freely between remedies which are identi-
cal aside from their locations in different governmental
branches. Beyond this, the court has provided little guidance to
litigants as to how it will approach future separation of powers
cases. Whittington leaves the court room to distinguish future
cases, should it choose to do so. Unless the South Carolina Su-
preme Court shows definitively that it intends to apply Whit-
tington's strict language to all types of governmental overlap,
emphasizing form without regard to substance, litigants should
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